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A PROPOSAL FOR RESTRUCTURING THE TAXATION
OF WEALTH TRANSFERS: TAX REFORM REDUX?
by
EDWARD J. GAC* AND SHAREN K. BROUGHAM**
I. ABSTRACT
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA'86) provided for the most dramatic
changes to the Internal Revenue Code since its inception over seventy years ago.
The stated purposes of these reforms were to promote "fairness, simplicity, and
economic growth." The short-term success of these measures has yet to be
ascertained.
It is the position of this article that the long-term prospects for ultimate in-
dividual tax reform cannot be divorced from an eventual restructuring of the pres-
ent federal wealth transfer taxation system, currently consisting of the estate, gift,
and generation-skipping taxes. Genuine tax reform will remain unfinished
business until such time as these transfers are fully interwoven into a reconstituted
individual taxation system. It is time for an integrated system which interpolates
the best elements of the newly passed income tax reforms while at the same time
jettisoning the cumbersome, complicated and inefficient elements of the present
wealth transfer taxes. This proposal is offered in the hope of changing the direc-
tion of future research and discussion away from the patchwork repairs of the past
towards a new integrated system of taxation.
II. INTRODUCTION
Nineteen eighty-six was a year of sweeping federal tax reform. With the stated
purpose of reducing complexity while increasing equity and efficiency,' the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) 2 was passed. By concentrating primarily on the in-
come tax, the act ignored a major source of complexity, inequity, and inefficiency:
the wealth transfer taxation of individuals.3
*Juris Doctor, Assistant Professor of Taxation and Business Law, College of Business, University of Col-
orado at Boulder.
** Master of Taxation; Certified Public Accountant; Doctoral Student, College of Business, University of
Colorado at Boulder.
I See generally, U.S. Treasury Department, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth: The
Treasury Department Report to the President (3 v., 1984).
2 Tax Reform Act Of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 (1986), [hereinafter referred to as TRA'86].
3 While the entire wealth transfer system, currently composed of the estate, gift and generation-skipping taxes,
is in need of reform this paper concentrates only on the problems of the estate and gift taxes. The original
attempt to deal with the problems of generation-skipping transfers in 1976 resulted in a tax which was so com-
plex and flawed that it was repealed in 1986, retroactive to 1976! While Congress should be applauded for
repealing a bad tax rather than attempting to "fix it," the tax which was adopted to replace it is not much im-
proved in the area of complexity. The new tax will need to be evaluated in terms of its costs to society versus
1
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The problems in the estate and gift taxes are legendary and reforms in this
area are, indeed, necessary. The Treasury Department Office of Tax Policy is ex-
pected to make ongoing recommendations for changes to the wealth transfer tax
structure in the coming year. In addition, at the request of the Treasury Depart-
ment, the American Bar Association initiated a study of these problems.4 Their
study has resulted in a Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring sponsored by the
American Bar Association Section of Taxation, Task Force on Transfer Tax
Restructuring.5
The ABA Report's recommendations center around rate restructuring,
clarification of the completed transfer rules, and limitation of allowable asset
valuation methods. Though the report has not yet received the ABA's own im-
primatur, several members of Congress have already cited certain elements of it
in the recent debate over the Revenue Bill of 1987. Various aspects of the report
will be discussed in detail throughout this article.
A key underlying assumption of both the Treasury Department and the ABA
Report is the idea that the basic existing structure should be retained.6 However,
reform of the present transfer tax system will not redress its most basic flaw: it
is a separate system of individual taxation. The estate and gift taxes are not, by
their natures, separate from the individual income tax either in their object of tax-
ation or in policy goals. They are historically and inherently linked.7 Past failure
to recognize this linkage has resulted in the current dual system of individual tax-
ation which creates unnecessary complexity and unjustified compliance costs for
both the taxpayer and the government.8 The time is ripe for this linkage to be
recognized through the merger and integration (hereafter called integration) of
the income and estate and gift taxes.
In general, this integration could be achieved by the repeal of the estate and
gift taxes and amendment of the income tax to include the receipt of all gifts and
the revenues which it generates and the dispersion of wealth which it accomplishes. While a favorable evaluation
does not appear likely, it nevertheless appears premature to advocate its outright appeal at this time. For this
reason, the main focus of this paper will be on the estate and gift taxes. A limited discussion of alternatives
for the generation-skipping tax is provided on pp 46-47, infra, text accompanying notes 119-20.
4 Letter from then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy Ronald A. Perlman to Hugh Caulkins,
then Chairman of the American Bar Association Section of Taxation (Nov. 19, 1985).
5Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, Holdsworth, scheduled for publication in the Winter, 1988 issue of
THE TAX LAWYER. [hereinafter referred to as ABA Report].
6 Indeed, steps taken by Congress over the years indicate a strong intent to keep the dual system rather than
an integrated income tax system. See also Osgood, Carryover Basis Repeal and Reform of the Transfer Tax
System, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 302 (1981).
7 For a discussion of this linkage, see Appendix I.
8McNulty, Fundamental Alternatives to Present Transfer Tax Systems, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY
PROPERTY 94-95 (E. Halbach ed. 1977), "The executive, judicial, and legislative costs of administering,
interpreting, and reforming these taxes are fairly large. The capital accumulation and other economic effects
of such taxes may be substantial and in important respects negative. Also, huge costs of compliance or legitimate
avoidance are borne by taxpayers, and tax-motivated planning involves more than transaction costs - it also
produces intrusions, distortions, and apparent inefficiencies in the allocation of economic resources, not to
mention inequities among taxpayers." See also Dobris, Marshalling Arguments in Favour of Abolishing the
Capital Transfer Tax, 6 BRITISH TAX REV. 367 (1984).
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RESTRUCTURING THE TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS
bequests in the taxable income of the transferee. While each of these two provi-
sions has individual merit, a proposal joining the two provisions would provide
a creative and effective solution to many of the problems which would preclude
the passage of either separately Though there have been calls to "leave things
alone for awhile," 10 an understandable reaction to the seemingly perpetual deluge
of major tax changes during the past few years," the simple reality is that the tax
code will not and cannot be left alone. Laforza del destino t 2 now upon us is deficit
reduction through combinations of reduced governmental spending and revenue
enhancement. Given the overriding need for more revenue in the post TRA86
era, wealth transfers provide a likely arena for further tax reform. 3
Long-term prospects for ultimate individual tax reform cannot be divorced
from an eventual restructuring of the present federal wealth transfer taxation
system. Such restructuring would continue to pursue the goals for which estate
and gift taxes were originally enacted, generating' 4 revenue while preventing
dynastic accumulations of wealth,' 5 and eliminate many of the inequities and in-
efficiencies entailed by maintaining the present dual system. The base broaden-
ing goals of TRA'86 now make integration a politically viable proposition and
a logical extension of that act,' 6 not a negation of it.
III. TAX POLICY PROBLEMS WITH WEALTH TRANSFER TAXES
1. Historical Quandary Over Death Taxes
Outright repeal of the estate and gift taxes has often been advocated in the
past though never fully accomplished in the United States.'7 Our society's attitude
9 McNulty, supra note 8, eloquently stated the case for integration, "(Integration into the income tax) would
read more understandably, yield more revenue, bear more fairly on taxpayers, administer and generally operate
more simply, impose lower transaction and compliance costs, redistribute more effectively and produce a
more neutral or otherwise more desirable influence on the allocation of resources."
"See Worthy, Testimony Before the House Ways and Means Committee, 4 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TAX
POLICY 4 (1985).
"The frightening fact is that, just prior to TRA86, "over 5,000 subsections of the I.R.C.... have been substan-
tially affected ... in less than eight years." Id. at 5. TRA86 contains about 1,850 separate Code amendments.
12 "The Force of Destiny," from the opera by Giuseppe Verdi, (1813-1901), first performed 10 Nov. 1862, based
on a play by Don Piave, after A.P. de Faavedra, Duke of Rivas, "Don Alvaro, 0 La Fuerza Del Sino" (1835).
3 While it is certainly understandable that wholesale changes in the entire tax structure could not be done
in one fell swoop, the Treasury Department's November, 1984 report to the President called for future con-
sideration of fundamental reforms to the federal wealth transfer structure. Supra note 1.
"'See Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifis and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1189 (1978), "It might seem that these receipt-oriented taxes would be less effective in raising revenue since
the number of transferees is usually greater than the number of transferors. But the effectiveness of any transfer
tax scheme in raising revenue - as well as in breaking up accumulations of wealth - depends upon its rates
and exemptions." See also McNulty, supra note 8, at 98.
15 Boskin, An Economists'Perspective On Estate Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPER-
TY 65 (E. Halbach ed. 1977), "My own opinion is that any attempt to reduce (substantially) inequality in
the distribution of wealth via estate and gift taxation is doomed to failure, quite apart from the questions of
its costs and thus its desirability."
16 McNulty, supra note 8, at 96, "To tax gifts and bequests as income would be to expand the base of the in-
come tax and to comprehend ... these important items of accretion ... (and) would enable (the income tax)
even better to 'get at' overall ability to pay."
7 See generally Dodge, supra note 14, at 1177; McNulty, supra note 8, at 94-95; Jatscher, The Aims of Death
1988]
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towards the estate and gift taxes has always been one of ambivalence. These taxes
best illustrate the inherent balancing act between the need to generate revenue and
the desire to promote social goals. There is no question that a confiscatory estate
tax could raise large amounts of revenue. If revenue were our only concern, then
the passage of a truly confiscatory tax, such as 100 percent of all properties owned
at death, would be the proper Congressional response. However, in addition to
generating revenues, any tax produces ancillary economic effects, the behavioral
consequences of which can not be predicted with certainty.18 Today, few would
argue that the effects of a truly confiscatory estate tax would ever be desirable.!9
Even strongly socialistic and communistic governments do not impose a true 100
percent death duty.20
In the United States, capitalism is based on the concept of private property,
and many of our current tax laws are designed to encourage private investment
and savings.2I By its very nature, capitalism requires the accumulation of private
capital, and its success is most often measured in terms of the amount of property
accumulated. Furthermore, most people believe that it is natural and "good" to
accumulate property with the expressed intention of providing benefits for their
heirs. 22 Yet it was fear of an "unhealthy" accumulation of property and the
economic and political power that it can generate, which fostered the adoption
of the original estate tax. Fear of dynastic power coupled with unlimited testamen-
tary disposition remains a legitimate tax policy concern today because of the long
track record of failure to limit wealth accumulation through wealth transfer taxes.
Balancing these two goals has kept the U.S. from raising maximum revenues
from the estate and gift taxes. While the economic results of a marginally con-
fiscatory tax are less severe than the 100 percent scenario described above, an ef-
fort to raise substantially higher revenues via the estate and gift taxes will limit
an individual's ability to pass wealth on to their heirs and discourage private sav-
ings and investment by entrepreneurs. 23
This inherent conflict is not unique to estate and gift taxes. All power to tax
must, in the end, be tempered by the realization that this power can also destroy.
Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 40-55 (E. Halbach ed. 1977); Surrey, An Introduc-
tion to Revision of the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 38 CALIF L. REV. 5 (1950). See also Dobris, supra
note 8, at 363. However, Graetz would hate to see these taxes repealed, ". . . (we) will have lost a great source
of humor." Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L. J. 259 (1983).
18 See Harris, Estate Taxation and Needs For Capital, 110 TR. & EST. 538-541 (1981); see also McNulty, supra
note 8, at 99.
19 See Dobris, supra note 8, at 365.
201t will be interesting to track any changes in the Soviet law of inheritance under the current movement towards
glasnost.
21 "The critical policy judgment in the law of (death taxation)... is the decision which locates the point at
which... (taxes) begin to discourage investment." Shaffer, Death, Property, and Ideals, in DEATH, TAXES
AND FAMILY PROPERTY 34 (E. Halbach ed. 1977).
22 See Halbach, An Introduction to Chapters 1-4, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 5 (E.
Halbach ed. 1977).
21See Boskin, supra note 15, at 60.
[Vol. 5
4
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 5 [1988], Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol5/iss1/4
RESTRUCTURING THE TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS
Nor will this proposal resolve the conflict between the revenue requirements and
social goals of taxation. Congress seems destined to dance around these twin fires
of tax policy for eternity. The proposal can, however, vastly improve the taxation
of individuals by improving the income tax base, a base which will take into ac-
count, finally, these true accretions of wealth.
2. Complexity v. Revenue
If one is to judge the estate and gift taxes on the traditional criteria of a "good
tax," 24 that it should be equitable, efficient, and simple to administer and com-
ply with, the estate and gift taxes are an abysmal failure. The current complexi-
ty of these laws is simply unacceptable. The ABA reform proposals, with regard
to the transfer sections, provide a limited attempt to address the need for clarity
and simplification 35 While quite possibly adding to that complexity in transition,
reform should set a more comprehensive course towards "fairness, simplicity,
and-economic growth" in the future.
Unfortunately, the cumulative effect of prior attempts to amend the law, in
order to render it more equitable, has resulted in a law which is almost incom-
prehensible. 6 The history of the estate and gift taxes is a litany of failures, the
most notable of which have been the recent attempts to correct generation-
skipping 27 and stepped-up basis problems.2
The complexity of the estate and gift taxes is especially unacceptable in rela-
tion to its ineffectiveness as a revenue raising device.29 Historically, the estate and
gift taxes have generated about the same amount of revenue as the excise tax on
cigarettes.30 And by the time the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) 3t
24 The seminal work on efforts to define a "good tax" is found in A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1910) book
V, chapter II, part II, "On Taxes," with reference to Smith's famous "cannons of good taxation." Other classic
works in this area would include: J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy (1921) book V, chapter II and A.C.
Pigou, A Study in Public Finance (1928) part II. A modern reference text widely used by economists is R.A.
Musgrave & P.B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice (4th Ed., 1984).
25See ABA Report, supra note 5, "Uniform Transfer Completion Rules" at 16-32.
26See Worthy, supra note 10, at 3, "... . unfortunately the response (to 'loopholes' in the income tax) frequently
has been enactment of a proliferation of complex, sometimes incomprehensible provisions incapable of be-
ing complied with or administered in any rational fashion (emphasis in original)." Mr. Worthy could have
also been speaking of the entire federal tax system in general, or of the transfer tax system in particular.
27Supra note 2, (TRA'86) Sec.s 1431 through 1433 therein, now reflected in the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, Tax on Generation-Skipping Transfers (Subchapters A-G of Chapter 13, §§ 2601-2663) (1986).
28Stepped-up basis for inherited property was eliminated by the carryover basis provisions of P.L. 94-455,
Sec. 2005, 90 Stat. 1872 (1976). These provisions, however, never became fully effective due to the complexity
ofI.R.C. § 1023 (1954) (See Sen. Rep. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 213-14 (1978)). The stepped-up basis
provisions were repealed by the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-223, Sec. 401(d), 94, Stat.
229 (1979)).
29 See Jatscher, supra note 17, at 40-41, "Indeed, in view of the small proportion of total receipts that these
taxes contribute and the high cost of administering them, it is arguable that if the taxes were only imposed
to raise revenue, they ought to be abolished." See also Dobris, supra note 8, at 369; Final Report of the
American Assembly on Death, Taxes and Family Property, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPER-
TY 187 (E. HALBACH ED. 1977) [hereinafter referred to as American Assembly Report].
30See Appendix 1.
31 Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
1988]
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is fully phased in, the revenue generated from estate and gift taxes should be
significantly less than revenues from the cigarette tax. Yet the costs of planning,
compliance, and enforcement have not been reduced. This problem is well il-
lustrated in the previously mentioned ABA Report, at Exhibit B, by a long and
convoluted will clause which is barely comprehensible to the practicing bar, let
alone the testator. If the purposes for which the estate and gift taxes exist - the
generation of revenue and the limiting of inherited power - can be accomplished
in a simpler and more equitable manner, they should be.
3. Equity
Under capitalism, we generally view the accumulation of property as "good,"
an equitable reward for a "job well done:' However, our attitudes towards inherited
wealth seem to differ significantly from our attitudes towards earned wealth.32
Inherited property is not viewed as a reward for a job well done; rather, it is seen
as a reward for an accident of birth. Our society's belief in equality of opportunity,
joined with the fear of dynastic power, led to the present laws' attempt to limit
the transfer of excessive wealth by gift or bequest. The current definition of ex-
cessive is any gift of more than $10,00013 to any nonspousal donee per year and
any estate in excess of $600,000? 4 In today's search for revenue enhancement, this
definition is considered by many to be overly generous. 35 In addition, these
generous thresholds of taxation have resulted in a significant decrease in the
number of individuals directly affected by the taxes.
The estate tax reaches a very small percentage of the nation's potential tax-
payers. For deaths occurring in 1982, less than two percent of all estates were re-
quired to file a return, and, of that two percent, barely more than half actually
paid any tax.36 It is estimated that, when the effects of ERTA are fully phased in,
the percentage of estates which actually pay a tax will be less than one-half of one
percent? 7 Yet the impact on those estates which are taxable can be quite dramatic.
The estate tax is one of the few high bracket individual taxes remaining after
TRA'86.38
It is impossible to be certain that it is only the estates of the wealthiest which
are impacted by this high bracket tax, or that the wealthiest are impacted equal-
32See American Assembly Report, supra note 29, at 184; DeWind, The Approaching Crisis in Federal Estate
and Gift Taxation, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 79-80 (1950).
331.R.C. § 2503(b) (1986).
34I.R.C. § 2010(b) (1986).
35 The American Assembly Report highlighted this ongoing debate, "It should be noted that there was not
in this Assembly, any more than there is in American society as a whole, a consensus concerning the amount
of individual wealth to be considered objectionable...", supra note 29, at 185. But see ABA Report, supra
note 5, at 10, par. 4.
36 See Bentz, Estate Tax Returns, 1983, I.R.S., Statistics of Income Bulletin, 1-12 (1984).
37 See Pedrick, Oh, To Die Down Under! Abolition of Death and Gift Duties in Australia, 35 TAX LAW. 113
(1981).
18 Compare the top brackets in 1987 for the Estate and Gift Tax - 55 percent PI.R.C. § 2001(C)(2)(d) (1986)]
to the top income tax brackets under TRA'86 - 38.5 percent [I.R.C. § l(h)(2) (1986)].
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ly. George Cooper, in A Voluntary Tax?, posits that the estate and gift taxes are
so riddled with loopholes that they are paid only by those decedents who die unex-
pectedly, fail to adequately plan for their death, have assets which do not easily
lend themselves to manipulation, or feel a moral obligation to pay their fair share.3 9
Unfortunately, the intervening years of reform have failed to correct these inequi-
ties noted by Cooper in 1979 It is still not merely the smallest estates which avoid
taxation nor the largest estates which pay the highest taxes.41
It has often been argued that the estate and gift taxes are necessary to add an
element of progression to the income tax and that the high bracket can be justified
on that ground alone.4 2 The new bracket structure of TRA'86 seems to belie any
continued justification for the tax on the basis of needed progressivity. TRA86
has determined that progression is of lesser importance than simplicity or equi-
ty in the income tax.43 The previous fifteen brackets have been condensed into
basically three, with an ultimate reduction in the maximum rate from fifty per-
cent to twenty-eight percent.44 If simplicity and equity are of primary importance
in the taxation of individuals, then the estate and gift taxes should also be brought
into harmony with these rates. The various avoidance techniques are too com-
plex and too expensive to create and administer. Furthermore, they are unequally
availed of both within and across brackets. Neither horizontal equity, the ability
to pay equally based on capacity, nor vertical equity, the progressive notion of
paying more by those with a greater capacity, is properly served by the present
bifurcated rate structure. In the end, a single rate structure applied to a more com-
prehensive measure of individual income would be more equitable.
4. Efficiency
For a tax to be considered efficient, it should not interfere with the workings
of our market system. Again, the estate and gift taxes fail this test.45 They interfere
with the markets' ability to allocate resources efficiently in three ways. The first
is in the great deal of human resources which are diverted to the conceptualiz-
ing, implementing, and managing of tax avoidance techniques which produce lit-
tle, if any, societal benefit. In addition, the scarce resources of the IRS are diverted
from the income tax to this area which produces little revenue.4 6
39 G. Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? 79 (1979).
40See also McNulty, supra note 8, at 94, "(federal transfer taxes) also produces.., inequities among tax-
payers depending upon whether they can avail themselves of expert advice"; Verbit, Do Estate and Gift Taxes
Affect Wealth Distribution? 117 Tr. & Est. 598, 674 (1978); Pedrick, supra note 37, at 126.
4
, Gross estates in excess of $300,000 reported in 1983 totaled only $50 billion, approximately two-thirds of
a $72 billion potential base. See Appendix I.
42 C. Shoup, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 100-101 & 119-120 (1966). But see Dobris, supra note 8, at 366.
43It is interesting to note that the ABA report also suggests that progression is of lesser importance. It pro-
poses a flat rate for estate and gift taxation, ABA report, supra note 5, at 3. But see Graetz, supra note 17,
at 285, "* . . the estate tax seems far more likely to wither than to grow stronger ... this prediction makes
me fear the demise of progressive taxation in the United States."
44Contrast I.R.C. § 1 (1954) with I.R.C. § 1 (1986).
45See American Assembly Report, supra note 29, at 187.
46See also Dobris, supra note 8, at 367.
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A second inefficiency results from the tax avoidance techniques themselves.
Most involve complex trust or corporate arrangements which often serve no pur-
pose other than the reduction of estate taxes. They tend to concentrate wealth in
paper entities which preclude easy access to the market.t 7 Given the progress made
by TRA86 in eliminating income tax shelters which had no economic or profit
motive when evaluated sans tax savings, such strictures to economic growth in
the wealth transfer system should now be assailed also.
The third major inefficiency is the way in which these taxes interfere with
timely investment decisions. This phenomenon is generally referred to as the "lock
in" effect; ie., keeping property off the open market so as to take advantage of
the deferential tax benefits of stepped-up basis. Since properties which have ap-
preciated in value, and are subsequently bequeathed, receive the benefits of
stepped-up basis while escaping the detriments of income taxation on the apprecia-
tion, the result is a decided bias towards the holding of nonmonetary assets. In
addition, this "death escape" precludes changing the form of ownership through
a sale and reinvestment during later years. The tax benefits forgone by engaging
in such transactions are simply too great. While this is really an inefficiency of
the income tax, it plays such a significant role in estate planning that it seems ap-
propriate to include it here.48
5. Problems of the Dual System
The current dual system of separate income and estate and gift taxes creates
unnecessary complexity and unjustified compliance costs for both the taxpayer
and the government. A great deal of time and money is spent by individual tax-
payers with the sole purpose of reducing the impact of income and transfer taxes.
Each tax requires its own specialists, and each requires the use of specialized,
and often conflicting, procedures for taking full advantage of the benefits
legitimately available under each. This conflict entails costly tax strategies which,
albeit successfully resolved from the specialist's point of view, often results in the
taxpayer's feeling of confusion and disillusionment about the entire tax system.
The frustrated taxpayer bears the ultimate cost for both sides by paying either in
taxes or fees. Thus, the inequities, inefficiencies, and complexities of each tax
are only compounded by the other. The ABA Report very clearly illustrates the
47 1d. at 367-368.
48While this integration proposal will significantly reduce the problem of the lock-in effect by requiring
transferees to "buy" their stepped-up basis (see Basis, infra. text accompanying notes 101-105.), it will not
entirely eliminate the problem since the transferor will continue to escape taxation on capital appreciation
accruing before transfer. The question of the propriety of treating gratuitous transfers as realization events
is extremely controversial and beyond the scope of this article. For a general discussion of the issue see Graetz,
Taxation of Unrealized Gains at Death: An Evaluation of the Current Proposals, 59 VA. L. REV. 830-859
(1973)); Hudson, Tax Policy and the Federal Taxation of the Transfer of Wealth, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
42-49 (1983); Covey, Possible Changes in the Basis Rule for Property Transferred by Gift or Death, 50 TAXES
837-843 (1972). See also Brannon, Some Economics of Tax Reform, 1986, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 278 (1986); Graetz
& McDowell, Tax Reform for 1985: The Quest for a Fairer, More Efficient and Simpler Income Tax, 3 YALE
L. & POLICY REV. 23 (1984); Boskin, supra note 15, at 66; Gutierrez, Taxation of Wealth Transmission:.
Problems and Reforms, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 82-83 (E. Halbach ed. 1977).
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extent of this complexity by the use of a "typical" will clause which is almost two
pages long.49
The duality of the present system has also needlessly increased complexity
and administrative costs for the government. For example, the current audit divi-
sion structure within the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provides for two separate
and distinct operations to review income and wealth transfer taxes. The estate,
gift, and generation-skipping audit operation is categorized as a completely
separate job classification and functionally operates within a separate sphere from
income tax audits. Even modest intra-agency proposals for a "combined audit"
at death in order to close out an individual's tax business have never really been
implemented by the IRS.50
Other examples of improved tax administration which would result from in-
tegration are provided in what might be generally called "limiting the absurds"
of tax benefits. As the structure now stands, one arm of the IRS simply often does
not know what the other arm is doing. The taxpayer is often able to take advan-
tage of this administrative ignorance. For example, under employee stock owner-
ship plan (ESOP) provisions of the code 5 the taxpayer receives certain benefits
based on valuation placed on closely-held stock transferred to employees under
an approved ESOP plan. From the income tax side, the Employee Benefit Sec-
tion of the Audit Division will be charged with the initial responsibility of review-
ing the value presented by the taxpayer. The key concern of the government is over
valuation. Yet, when that same stock shows up on an estate tax return the issue
is quickly reversed. Now, with the tax base arising from the value of included
assets in the estate, under valuation becomes the central issue. Under an integrated
system, the stock would be valued only once for income tax purposes and that
value should be binding on all subsequent income tax transactions, with proper
adjustments for lapse of time, etc.
There are numerous other scenarios such as this which point to the same
essential result of inefficient tax administration and lost revenue resulting from
a bifurcated individual tax structure. While many of the benefits which would
result from closer cooperation within the IRS could, and should, be adopted
without necessarily integrating the two taxes, the best cooperation would be
facilitated by full integration of these taxes into a unified individual tax structure.
49ABA Report, supra note 5, at Exhibit B.
1°There are some recent positive steps being taken within the audit division. In the area of reviewing fiduciary
income tax returns filed by trusts, on a very limited basis, several districts are experimenting with the train-
ing of estate tax personnel to conduct audits of those returns. This may be due, in part, to the fact that fiduciary
income tax reporting is one of the most under examined areas of audit review. Currently the audit percen-
tages on fiduciary tax returns stands at about four-tenths of one percent of all returns filed (per phone con-
versations with audit personnel at the Denver and San Francisco District Offices of the I.R.S. during 1986).
Certainly this can be improved upon in a more fully integrated personal tax structure.
51I.R.C. §§ 404; 1042; 2210; 6018(c) (1986).
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IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES
Since 1916, a number of proposals to replace the estate and gift taxes have
been advanced 52 The primary alternatives discussed have been: [1] a federal in-
heritance tax," [2] a periodic wealth tax,54 [3] an accessions tax,15 and [4] incor-
poration into the income tax.56 While none has been adopted in its entirety, some
of the better elements of each have been incorporated into the seventy years of
ongoing amendment to the existing estate and gift taxes.
An inheritance tax is assessed on the heir, rather than the decedent's estate,
and the rate of taxation is generally based on the relationship to the decedent.
Elements of an inheritance tax can be found in the unlimited marital deduction57
and the exclusion of payments for the support, education, and medical needs of
dependent children from the gift tax.58 These sections are a necessary recogni-
tion that the family relationship is not inherently a financial one,59 but rather it
is a relationship of mutual support which, at times, can involve finances. Integra-
tion should retain the current exclusions under I.R.C. Section 102 to the extent
that they continue to recognize and foster the intra-family relationship elements
of support, education and medical necessities. These are equitable provisions and
should be maintained in any future changes.
A European-styled wealth tax attempts to measure the "worth" of an in-
dividual and bases the tax liability upon this indication of "ability to pay." The
classic example of its advantages in matching tax with ability to pay is the case
of the beggar and the gold hoarder.6 ° They have equal tax liability under the in-
s2 ERTA, in the opinion of Pedrick, supra note 37, at 113, ". .. brought the United States to within an inch
of [Reagan's] expiessed campaign wish to abolish the estate and gift tax." The administration did not pur-
sue repeal as a matter of political expediency. The fear of giving too many breaks to the "rich" was the over-
riding concern in the decision. Using 20/20 hindsight, it was apparent to Congress in 1986 that many of the
"capital-raising" provisions of the 1981 Act, such as "fast-ACRS" for real estate, etc., were simply too generous
and created serious revenue erosion.
13 In 1898, the federal government imposed an inheritance tax which was upheld in Knowlton v. Moore, 178
U.S. 41 (1900); the Senate Finance Committee urged that an inheritance tax be substituted for the estate tax
in 1918, SEN. REP. No. 67, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1918), 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 127. Federal and State Death
Taxes, A Report to the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation (U.S.G.P.O., 1933). See Rudick, What
alternative to the Estate and Gift Taxes?, 38 CALIF L. REV, at nn. I & 41 (March 1950).
54 See Cooper, Taking Wealth Taxation Seriously, 34 THE RECORD 24-57 (1979); Verbit, supra note 40, at
677, 679-680; Jastscher, supra note 17, at 46-49; Isaacs, Do We Want a Wealth Tax in America?, 32 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 23 (1977).
"See generally Bravenec & Lassila, An Accessions Emphasis For Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, TAX NOTES
1069 (1984); ALl, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation 446-589 (1969); Andrews, The Accessions Tax Proposal,
22 TAX L. REV. 589 (1967). See also Boskin, supra note 15, at 66; Jatscher, supra note 17, at 54-55; McNulty,
supra note 8, at 89-93; American Assembly Report, supra note 29, at 187; Rudick, supra note 56, at 150-182;
Rudick, A Proposal for an Accessions Tax, 1 TAX L. REV. 25 (1945).
56 See Dodge, supra note 14; McNulty, supra note 8 at 95-99; American Assembly Report, supra note 29,
at 187; Hudson, supra note 48, at 59.
57 1.R.C. § 2056 (1986).
58l.R.C. § 2503(e) (1986).
59 But see Rhodes, Individual, Couple, or Family? The Unit of Taxation for Transfer Tax Purposes: A Shif-
ting Focus, 17 AKRON L. REV 607 (1984).
60 See Bale, Temporal Equity in Taxation, 55 CAN. B. REV. 17 (1977).
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come tax but unequal ability to pay. A wealth tax would remedy this inequitable
situation since it would tax the hoarder on his accumulation, regardless of what
the income is, while the beggar would continue to escape liability.
One strong argument in favor of retaining the estate and gift tax comes from
the arguments supporting a periodic wealth tax: ability to pay is assured. The cur-
rent tax is essentially a wealth tax; it simply is not periodic, except as relates to
gifts.6' The estate and gift tax, however, seems to share more of the disadvantages
of the wealth tax than its better elements. Both entail the problems of valuation,
liquidity, and discovery.62
An accessions tax, like the inheritance tax, is assessed on the heir rather than
the decedent's estate and is generally assessed at a progressive rate which favors
transfers among closely related parties. The accessions tax proposed by Andrews 63
incorporated many of the elements of a consumption tax which foster savings and
is considered by many to better incorporate the concept of ability to pay than either
a wealth or income tax. An accessions tax looks to the situation where taxpayers
with equal economic income have unequal tax liabilities due solely to the fact that
one is unlucky enough to have to earn his income while the other is fortunate
enough to receive his as gift or bequest.
An accessions tax accumulates all gratuitous transfers received during a tax-
payer's lifetime and imposes a progressive tax on them. It is this accumulation
requirement, as well as its shift in the incidence of taxation to the transferee, that
has probably prevented its acceptance in the wealth transfer area. If and when the
notion of accessions based taxation is accepted, it is most likely to happen at the
income tax level with taxation of estate and gifts collaterally caught in the new
web. A variation on this theme is found in Aaron and Galper's Assessing Tax
Reform.64 That plan is entitled "The Cash Flow Income Tax" and is "based on
the principle that all income should be taxed once in the course of a taxpayer's
lifetime." 65 That tax would be imposed on all consumption plus transfers to others
through gifts or bequests. 66
The fourth alternative to the estate and gift taxes, its integration into the in-
come tax, takes an approach which is similar to the accessions tax. The incidence
of taxation would be shifted to the recipient. Unlike the accessions tax, however,
this approach would not accumulate the transfers. Rather, it would merely include
all gifts and bequests which were received during the current period in the cur-
rent taxable income of the transferee. A primary reason why this suggestion has
61 Id. at 8. But see Jatscher, supra note 17, at 48... "The differences between a death tax and a periodic tax
on net wealth are so substantial that I do not believe a death tax can be supported as a substitute for the other."
62See Cooper, supra note 54, at 33-43; Isaacs, supra note 54, at 39-46.
63 See Andrews, supra note 55.
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failed to be adopted in the past is that this rather simple approach has almost always
been advanced in conjunction with a call to radically change the income tax.67
It has most often been tied to the adoption of an accessions or a consumption tax.
The concept of integrating the estate and gift taxes into the income tax, not
as a separate tax on transfers, but as an item of taxable income to the transferree,
deserves reexamination during the present climate of ongoing tax reform. Such
a provision would be a bona fide extension of the base broadening efforts of
TRA 86, and could be accomplished in a relatively easy and straightforward man-
ner. This change would more closely match the "official" incidence of taxation
with the "emotional" incidence, and would eliminate many of the inequities and
inefficiencies which result from the duality of the present system of individual
taxation.
V. OUTLOOK FOR REFORM OF ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES
Prior attempts to reform the existing estate and gift taxes have mainly taken
the form of closing loopholes.68 However, rather than merely closing existing
loopholes, these reforms have most often generated more complex techniques of
tax avoidance. This is a concern with the approach taken in the ABA Report.6 9
That report does include a number of real reforms such as a flat tax rate,70
portability 7' between spouses of a new and higher exemption,72 and a number of
other positive proposals such as those which clarify what constitutes complete
versus incomplete transfers 73 The ABA Report's basic problem is that it assumes
the continuation of the present dual track individual federal tax system. As worthy
as the ABA proposals are, seventy years of fixing is enough. Gratuitous transfers
of wealth have never been properly included in any comprehensive plan for the
taxation of individuals.
Some of the key arguments against repeal are these: [1] transfer taxes limit
the extent to which wealthy parents can confer unearned advantages on their
children, 74 [2] transfer taxes provide not only a back up to, but also an element
67 1d. But see Dodge, supra note 14; Bale, supra note 60, at 13.
68 See Halbach, An Introduction To Chapters 5 & 6, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 69-70
(E. Halbach ed. 1977), "The tragedy of the history of American transfer taxes to date is that we have paid
the price of change without the benefits of real improvement, even with respect to those desired qualities about
which there is a consensus."





7 4 Or at the minimum, the tax is perceived to limit those advantages. Continuing this perception is considered
a worthy purpose in and of itself. See Dobris, supra note 8, at 378, "... statistics and empirical studies are
less important than perceptions." See also Gutierrez, supra note 48, at 84; Graetz, supra note 17, at 259; Gut-
man, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VIR L. R. 1209-1212 (1983); Worthy, supra
note 10, at 2; Rhodes, supra note 59, at 607; Robinson, The Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes - A Requiem, 1
AMER. J. TAX POLICY. 39 (1982).
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of progressivity in, the income tax, [3] charities would lose a major source of
funds, and [4] the deficit makes the elimination of any revenue source unwise at
this time.
In response to the first objection, interesting studies by John A. Brittain sug-
gest that inherited wealth is of limited importance to this question. 5 The advan-.
tages which the children of the wealthy enjoy are primarily the result of better
educations, more propitious marriages, and noncapital advantages in the form
of "pull." 76 These social issues can be better addressed through improved op-
portunities in education and job markets, not through the tax laws. If our con-
cern is really one of limiting the transfer of wealth-related power rather than
limiting the transfer of economic advantages, then any tax which favored the
dispersion of accumulations, such as the breaking up of excessive concentrations
of wealth,77 would be preferable.78
As to the second argument, that the estate and gift taxes are necessary to cor-
rect flaws in the income tax, our response is to agree that there are flaws in the
income tax. We disagree, however, that the present estate and gift taxes can cor-
rect these flaws, or even that they should be used to accomplish that purpose. 9
The flaws of the income tax should be addressed and amended through the in-
come tax laws, not through a dual system of taxation.
In response to the third argument, charitable bequests at death are a major
source of revenues for many worthwhile organizations,8 0 although one is tempt-
ed to reconsider this supposition in light of that highly publicized air conditioned
doghouse for Jim and Tammy Bakker's pet.8 ' However, the argument that charities
75See J. Brittain, The Inheritance of Economic Status (1977); Boskin, supra note 15, at 63, "Will a decrease
in bequests decrease inequality? I very much doubt it"; Jatscher, supra note 17, at 52, "Not all wealth is in-
herited, and therefore even if all inheritances were confiscated by the state the distribution of wealth in
American society would still be unequal..."; Verbit, supra note 40, at 677. See also J. Brittain, Inheritance
and the Inequality of Material Wealth (1978).
76 See Brittain, The Inheritance of Economic Status, supra note 75, at 29-34.
77The income tax, with its "pay as you go" element is intrinsically better suited for pursuit of this goal. It
would give real teeth to the notion of checks on unhealthy accumulations of wealth due to its annual account-
ing. This timing structure would be far superior to the present dual system in which the taxpayer need only
account to the government once in a lifetime, or in an effective generation-skip, only twice in three lifetimes.
Annual accounting should also enhance compliance.
78 See also Jatscher, supra note 17, at 54, "The anti-concentration aim calls for a death tax tailored to the cir-
cumstances of the recipient rather than those of the decedent..."; Boskin, supra note 15, at 66, "Another
potential improvement would be to move away from the estate (transferor-oriented) tax to a transferee-oriented
tax."
79But see Surrey, supra note 17, at 6.
80 Even though private giving reported in 1977 accounted for only 22 percent of charities' receipts (and slightly
less than 20 percent of that amount came from bequests) all private receipts are essential to maintain the in-
dependent status of most charities and, according to Salamon & Clotfelter, "anything that threatens private
giving threatens the very essence of the private (charitable) sector." See Salamon & Clotfelter, Will the Tax
Act Hurt Charitable Giving?, 120 TR. & EST. 8-9 (1981). In addition, charitable contributions reported on
1983 estate tax returns totaled $2.5 billion (Bentz, supra note 36), a not insignificant amount.
s The House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight held hearings in the fall of 1987 to review the federal
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would lose this revenue source if the estate and gift taxes -were repealed is not
necessarily valid. Decedent contributions seem to arise primarily from the
decedents' wishes to contribute to their fellow man rather than a wish to reduce
estate taxes.82 The relative stability of past estate tax rates has made the price
elasticity of charitable bequests difficult to investigate. 83 Future research in this
area should be facilitated by the annually decreasing rates of ERTA.a4 Until such
research becomes available, preferential treatment for these contributions should
be continued. Their favored status under the estate and gift taxes could easily be
accommodated through integration in the income tax, which already provides in-
centives for charitable giving8 5
As to the fourth argument, repeal is not likely to be easily accomplished in this
age of Draconian deficits. The ever constant struggle of vested interest groups, both
in and out of the government, to increase or decrease, respectively, their piece of the
"tax pie," makes it very difficult to ask Congress for repeal of any tax without an
equitable means of raising replacement revenue. No matter how bad the tax or how
small the revenues, the deficit prohibits serious consideration of any proposal which
would even marginally lower federal revenues. Coupling repeal of estate and gift
taxes with an inclusion of gratuitous transfers in the taxable income of the transferee
could meet this revenue requirement. Through manipulation of the exclusion
amounts, Congress could assure that the integration proposal was revenue neutral
or even revenue enhancing if it so desired. The integration proposal advocated by
this paper, and detailed in the following section, is not merely a loophole plugging
approach to transfer tax reform. It offers an opportunity to substantially simplify the
taxation of individuals while solving many of the problems associated with other
reforms. If is also provides another reasonable avenue for deficit reduction, so be
it.
VI. INTEGRATION OF ESTATE AND GIFT TAX INTO THE INCOME TAX
1. Introduction
Many issues arise from a plan to integrate estate and gift taxes into the in-
12See Tidd, Tax Act May Not Hurt Charitable Giving, 120 TR. & EST. 16 (1981). See also Friedman, The
Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 24 (E. Halbach
ed. 1977); Westfall, Revitalizing the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1002-1006 (1970) But
see Salamon & Clotfelter, supra note 80, at 10.
"
3There is virtually no analysis in this area according to Salamon & Clotfelter, supra note 80, at 9. But see
Boskin, Estate Taxation And Charitable Bequests, 5 J. PUBLIC ECON. 27-56 (1976); Feldstein, Charitable
Bequests, Estate Taxation, And Inter-generational Wealth Transfers, in RESEARCH PAPERS, sponsored by
the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, v. III, Special Behavioral Studies, Foundations
and Corporations, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1485-1500 (1977); Barthold & Plotnick, Estate Taxation
and Other Determinants Of Charitable Bequests, 37 NAT'L. TAX J. 225-237 (1984); Watson, A Note On The
Effects of Taxation On Charitable Giving Over The Life Cycle And Beyond, 99 QRTLY. J. ECON. 639-684
(1984).
84I.R.C. § 2001 (1986).
85 Since the decedent will no longer need to retain assets until death to receive maximum advantage by reducing
the high bracket estate tax, rather than the lower income tax rates, it might induce the wealthy to accelerate
the timing of their gifts. See Dodge, supra note 14, at 1209.
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come tax. This paper postulates integration of the best elements of prior studies86
and offers alternatives in areas where potential problems exist. It is not intend-
ed to be a detailed prescription for tax reform, nor is it an attempt to rewrite the
code in these pages. It is an attempt to remind Congress that its commitment to
fundamental tax reform which began with TRA'86 should be continued. It is time
for tax reform redux.
2. Incidence of Taxation
The proposed procedure to integrate the two taxes is relatively straightfor-
ward. It centers on the repeal of three code sections: Sections 2001 and 2501 which
impose the estate and gift taxes on the transferor and Section 102 which excludes
gifts and bequests from the taxable income of the transferee. Obviously, the ac-
tual mechanics Will be far more complex. But repeal of these sections will shift
the incidence of taxation from the transferor to the transferee. While this is a
radical departure from historical tax policy, it has the advantage of finally match-
ing the "official" incidence of taxation to its "emotional" incidence. Most lay tax-
payers already believe that gifts and bequests are included in taxable income. From
the media, taxpayers have learned that most forms of windfalls, such as lottery
winnings and the Nobel Prize, are taxed as income.87 The "person on the street"
sees the equity in taxing "windfalls" to the same extent as wages, i.e., both make
them better off, both are income. It is quite often with gleeful surprise that the
taxpayer learns from their friendly neighborhood tax return preparer that they
can exclude gifts and bequests.
Nor does the average taxpayer recognize an estate as a separate taxpaying en-
tity. Even those who have the sophistication to handle the probating of a will argue
that they, not the estate, have paid the tax. By the time the estate tax return is filed,
title and possession of the property have often passed; the property is "theirs;"
"they" write the check; it is "their" bank balance which decreases. Integration
into the income tax will only match the official incidence of taxation to the one
who already emotionally and ultimately bears the tax.88
3. Exclusions
The income tax will need to be amended so that reasonable amounts of gifts
and bequests would continue to escape all taxation. The need for such exclusions
from income is obvious. As a practical matter they are necessary for administrative
convenience: we do not want to have to attach 1099's to every birthday present
nor to have to invite the IRS to join Santa at the chimney each December. Nor
would the reform have a prayer of passage unless it assured that the lower economic
86 See ABA Report, supra note 5; Andrews, supra note 55; Dodge, supra note 14; Aaron & Galper, supra
note 64.
17 I.R.C. § 61(a) and § 74(a) (1986).
8s See Jatscher, supra note 17, at 47, "Death taxes normally have either no effect or only a small effect on the
owners of the wealth and are borne instead by the heirs of the owners."
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classes would not be subject to the tax. A reasonable exclusion should also be
adopted to prevent the imposition of an undue burden on the economic classes
which will be affected by the changes. Along these same lines, the ABA Report
proposes a three tier level of exclusions.8 9
Reasonable amounts for exclusion will need to be set by Congress after careful
balancing of revenue versus equity. The 1981 changes to the annual gift exclusion
have simply allowed for too much revenue loss. This is especially true for large
families.
At least in the short term, the new exclusions should approximate the amounts
which would result if the current exclusions available to the transferor (under estate
and gift taxes) were apportioned among the potential transferees (under the in-
come tax). While no transition can be painless, this will minimize transition prob-
lems by making the taxable results under the reform proposal more closely match
the existing results. If the tax consequences do not significantly change, existing
estate plans should not need to be significantly changed. In addition, all effec-
tive dates should be prospective rather than in any way retroactive. The detrimental
effects of retroactive provisions on tax planning have long been a thorn in the side
of tax practitioners.
Over the long run, however, we do not advocate a straight allocation of the
transferor's exclusions to the transferee. We do not believe that each recipient
should be able to exclude $10,000 per year from each separate donor nor do we
favor splitting the $600,000 unified credit equivalent between the existing heirs,
which could result in a sole heir excluding $600,000 while each of twelve heirs
excludes only $50,000 apiece. If the primary goals of tax reform are simplicity,
equity, and efficiency, then the exclusions must be determined at the transferee
level, not the transferor. To enhance simplicity, the reform should not require the
taxpayer to look to any other taxpayer to determine tax liability; each taxpayer
should stand alone.0 To enhance equity, taxpayers who receive equal gratuitous
amounts should receive equal tax treatment. Their tax liability should not depend
on their good fortune in having lots of donative sponsors or their dubious fortune
in having many equally loved siblings. Exclusion should be limited to a specific
amount per transferee, regardless of its source.
However, the present special treatment provided by income tax Section 102
which excludes certain intrafamily transfers from taxation should be preserved.
These provisions, particularly the exclusion of 100 percent of all transfers between
"
9Supra note 5, at 10, "Gift Tax Annual Exclusion," paragraphs A through E (inclusive). These provisions
would provide for a $100 de minimis per donee exclusion, a $10,000 annual per donee exclusion, and an overall
$30,000 annual cap per donor. Certain gifts to charities, spouses, and political organizations would not be
subject to the $30,000 cap.
90 An exception should, of course, be made for "serial deaths." In the unfortunate situation where the same
properties could pass through the income tax base of more than one person due to intrafamilial deaths oc-
curring within one or two years of each other, an appropriate credit system should be adopted. This credit
could be patterned, in part, after existing I.R.C. § 2013 (credit for tax on prior transfers).
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spouses9 and the exclusion of parental transfers in discharge of obligations for
support, schooling, and medical expenses are a necessary recognition of the
special relationship within families. These transfers, which also are currently ex-
cluded from taxation under estate and gift taxes, should continue to be excluded
from taxation under an integration proposal. This treatment is consistent with the
proposals of the ABA Report.9 2 The ongoing administrative problem is how to
distinguish between gifts and payments which are parental obligations of support
such as for school and medical expenses. The present rules which seek to pro-
vide these distinctions need to be clarified in any event due to the TRA'86 changes
with regard to the imposition of the "kiddie tax." 93
4. Rates
A beneficial aspect of this proposal would be the elimination of the present
differential rate structure between income and wealth transfer. It would also end
most cumulative computations with regard to wealth transfers. These benefits
would be consistent with the spirit of simplification initiated in 1986. Gratuitous
transfers should merely be included in the current year's taxable income with no
provision for special taxation of these amounts. They are income; they will be
taxed at the applicable income tax rate.
While the provisions of an accessions tax, which accumulates gifts and be-
quests received throughout the transferee's lifetime and taxes them at progressive
rates, could substantially improve equity among taxpayers,94 the losses in simplici-
ty could far outweigh the enhanced equity. Since TRA'86, progression simply is
not the major factor it once was. Regardless of the year, or years of receipt, the
rate would vary only between fifteen percent and thirty-three percent,9" barring
Congressional rate tampering. The record keeping requirements entailed by an
accessions tax, along with the necessity of delaying the closing out of each in-
dividual income tax return, would be a substantial impediment to simplicity. The
91 In most instances the marital exclusion would be unnecessary for bequests since the widow/widower is per-
mitted to file ajoint return for the year of death. The need would arise only when the bequests were receiv-
ed in a subsequent period. The income tax exclusion for inter vivos spousal gifts, and subsequent bequests,
is consistent with the filing of a joint return. The income of the taxing unit has not increased. See Dodge,
supra note 14, at 1193.
92 ABA Report, supra note 5, at 11.
9 3TRA'86 established special rules for the taxation of income of a minor child. If a child under 14 years of
age has income derived from property transferred from a parent (parental-source unearned income), the bill
taxes the unearned income to the child at the parents' marginal tax rate, if at least one parent is living at the
end of the tax year. I.R.C. § l(i) (1986).
94But see Dodge, supra note 14, at 1191, "The income tax proposal has the advantage of only measuring present
ability to pay rather than basing tax rates on questionable assumptions about past use of capital." See also
McNulty, supra note 8, at 93, "If one wishes to take into account overall taxpaying ability, including income,
one naturally looks for other tax structures. These might include a periodic, comprehensive wealth tax or
an income tax that includes donative receipts in its base (emphasis added); Hudson, supra note 48, at 53-54,
"Indeed the income tax approach is an improvement over the accessions tax in that the income tax is measured
by the recipient's present ability to pay.
95 1.R.C. § 1 (1986).
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cumulative aspects of an accessions tax should not be included in the proposed
integration of the estate and gift taxes into the income tax. Each tax year should
stand alone; current income should be taxed in the current period; each year's
tax return should be complete unto itself.
To enhance efficiency, there should be no preference for one type of gratuitous
transfer over another. This goal was partially attained in the present system when
the separate estate and gift taxes were integrated in 1976.96 Integration was ac-
complished by the use of a unified credit, a single tax rate, and inclusion of all
post 1976 taxable gifts in the estate tax calculations.
This unifying process should now be carried to its next logical and evolu-
tionary stage of integration into the "mainstream" of federal taxation: the income
tax structure. The main focus of wealth transfer taxation could then be shifted from
the unified credit towards selecting the proper annual exclusions. These exclu-
sions would be selected by Congress on the basis of balancing the tax policy goals
of equity, fairness, and administrative simplicity against the real and present need
to enhance revenues. As for transfers at death, we should spread bequests out as
though they were received as gifts. This could be accomplished rather easily by
simply adopting a form of forward averaging for any bequests which were re-
ceived.97
A forward averaging provision, if adopted, would not only enhance efficiency
by equalizing the treatment of gifts and bequests but also alleviate many liquidi-
ty problems which might result from "bunching." 98 The forward averaging pro-
vision should not, however, be made available for gifts. Since these are discre-
tionary transfers, if one does not wish to incur bunching, one does not need to
accept the gift.99 In addition, certain "hardship" provisions such as Section 6166
could be effectively carried over from the present estate tax law.100
5. Basis
Sections 1014 and 1015 of the income tax have long created a divergent and
disjointed treatment of income tax basis arising out of wealth transfers. Section
1015 gives the donee a carryover basis in gifts whereas Section 1014 gives the re-
cipient a fair market value (FMV) basis in bequests. The process of tax reform
has long wrestled with this inconsistent treatment, but prior attempts to amend
96 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
97 See example, Appendix II.
9' For an example of how forward averaging is currently being applied to the taxpayers' benefit, see I.R.C.
§ 402(e) (1986) (10-year averaging for lump sum distributions from certain qualified employee plans). However,
since progression-has been greatly reduced under TRA'86, the problem of bunching has also been greatly
reduced.
99 SeeDodge, supra note 14, at 1190.
10 0 1. R.C. § 6166 (1986), "extension of time for payment of estate tax where estate consists largely of interest
in closely held business."
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this inefficient and inequitable situation have failed.10' This integration proposal
offers a unique opportunity to significantly reduce the two-sided basis problem.
Since the taxpayer will include the FMV of all gifts and bequests in taxable in-
come, the taxpayer is entitled to a FMV basis in all properties so received. The
taxpayer is, in effect, "buying" a FMV basis.
This is an equitable and workable solution which incorporates the better
elements of the carryover basis amendment10 2 while avoiding its complex book-
keeping requirements. Since we propose taxing the FMV of gratuitous transfers,
not appreciation, there is little need to discover the transferor's basis. In addition,
there will be no need to value all property as of the date of enactment to assure
that only prospective gains are being taxed.103 Nor will this proposal entail the
complex transition rules of carryover basis. 0 4 Just as the decision to tax 100 per-
cent of capital gains was adopted without transition by TRA'86, the decision to
tax 100 percent of gratuitous transfers can be adopted without transition
allowances. TRA86 reduced the tax rates on ordinary income to justify the 100
percent inclusion of capital gains. This integration proposal will repeal the estate
and gift taxes, justifying the 100 percent inclusion of gratuitous transfers at the
lower income tax rates.
While some will argue that this involves "double taxation" of the transferor's
basis, these arguments are without merit. Currently the FMV of the property,
which includes the basis, is subject to the estate and gift taxes. This proposal sim-
ply replaces those taxes with an income tax levied on the transferee. 105
As to spousal transfers, Section 1041(b)(2), which gives the transferee-spouse
a carryover basis in properties so received should be retained. Since 100 percent
of all spousal transfers will continue to be excluded from the income tax, the
transferee should not be entitled to a FMV basis. The spouse simply has not
"bought" a new basis. As to nonspousal transfers which escape income taxation
(those which fall below the exclusion amounts), these properties should also
receive a carryover basis in the hands of the transferee. Legitimate economic con-
siderations outweigh the sacrifice in administrative simplicity. Only taxed
nonspousal transfers should receive a FMV basis.
6 Transfers in Trust
In very simplistic terms, under the present law, ideally all transfers of cor-
101 For a discussion of these problems refer to note 28, supra.
1l2d.
103 See Lewis, Taxing Unrealized Gains: The Nettle and the Flower, 4 REV. TAX'N. INDIVIDUALS 19-21
(1981).
10 4 P.L. 94-455, supra note 28.
"0sSee Dodge, supra note 14, at 1188, ' .. double taxation (of gifts and bequests) has existed since 1916...
the income tax proposal concerns only the form of 'double taxation.' Moreover, double taxation is not
undesirable if it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the particular tax system." Perhaps a more ap-
propriate nomenclature here would be to avail ourselves of a "second taxing opportunity" on a second "trans-
action" involving the same property.
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pus to a trust are taxed to the grantor under the estate and gift taxes just as though
they were direct transfers to the beneficiaries. Inter vivos transfers are subject to
the gift tax if they are completed transfers, while incomplete inter vivos and all
testamentary transfers are included in the decedent's estate. 10 6 The income from
the corpus is generally taxed to the beneficiaries if it is distributed to them or to
the trust if it is retained.107
The ABA Report's proposed rules for the clarification of the complete ver-
sus incomplete transfer'0 8 would substantially simplify one of the most complex
issues in the taxation of transfers to trusts. These rules substantially simplify the
timing of wealth transfer taxation, and this proposal strongly advocates their com-
plete examination.
Two prior proposals which offered alternatives to the present estate and gift
taxes were Aaron and Galper's cash flow income tax 109 and Andrews' accessions
tax. 10 While both had many fine points to recommend their adoption, their treat-
ment of transfers in trust would not be appropriate for inclusion in an income tax
alternative to the estate and gift taxes. Both deferred taxation of all transfers in
trust until either the corpus or the income was subsequently distributed to the
beneficiaries. The cash flow income tax further delayed taxation until such time
as the beneficiary consumed the transfer. While this exclusion of all transfers in
trust from current taxation had merit under Aaron and Galper's tax proposal, it
is not equitable treatment under either the current income or an alternative ac-
cessions tax." 11 The current tax liabilities of two individuals who receive equal
amounts of gratuitous transfers should not differ simply because one receives his
transfer in the form of outright ownership while the other receives his in the form
of a beneficial trust interest. If this deferral of taxation on all transfers in trust were
adopted no one would ever again intentionally receive an outright transfer of any
amount which exceeded the exclusion provisions. 1 2 The inefficiencies and ineq-
uities which currently exist in the estate and gift taxes would be magnified, not
diminished.
'
0 61.R.C. § 2031 (1986).
"o"See primarily I.R.C. §§ 641 and 661 (1986).
108 See ABA Report, supra, note 5, at 16.
109 See Aaron & Galper, supra note 64. But see Graetz & McDowell, supra note 48, at 11 note 30, "proposal
for a consumption tax which (Aaron & Galper) label a 'lifetime income tax.'"
"°See Andrews, supra note 55.
I I See also Alexander, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation: The Major Issues Presented in the American Law
Institute Project, 22 TAX L. REV. 682 (1977). But see Andrews, supra note 55; Dodge, supra note 14; and
McNulty, supra note 8.
112 Contra. Dodge, supra note 14, at 1184, "Clearly, (trusts) merely serve the ends of individuals; here they
serve to facilitate gratuitous transfers. Taxation of entities can therefore be justified only as a means of counterac-
ting the deferral of tax that results naturally from the economic function of(these) entities." However, we feel
'counteracting the deferral of tax' which can result not only from trusts' 'economic function' but also from
their 'fiscal function' - the pure deferral of tax liability - is sufficient justification for denying exclusion
from income taxation for transfers of corpus to trusts. See Alexander, supra note 111, at 658-65; Rudick, supra
note 56, at 168-171; Westfall, supra note 82, at 1006.
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The most equitable treatment for transfers of corpus to trusts would be to ig-
nore the trust completely and tax all such transfers as though they had been con-
structively received by the beneficiary. Since a gift or bequest would be considered
income if received directly by an individual, it should also be considered income
if received indirectly via trust. The transfers should be attributed to the
beneficiaries and taxed to them currently.
This "pure conduit" approach was, in fact, recently proposed for fiduciary
taxation of grantor trusts.'t 3 The proposal would have attributed all trust income,
regardless of whether it had been retained or distributed, to the beneficiaries. Tax
would have then been imposed on the trust using the applicable individual income
tax rate. The proposal was, however, soundly rejected because of the enormous
problems of attribution from multibeneficiary trusts and the insurmountable com-
plexities which would have resulted from the need to combine the information
from multiple trusts to determine the tax liability of even one."t4 In light of these
very practical objections to this economically sound concept, we cannot advocate
that the pure conduit approach be adopted as a binding provision in any reform
proposal.
We do, however, advocate an elective pure conduit approach to integrate the
estate and gift taxes into the income tax. To improve equity in the income tax, all
gifts and bequests should be included in the current income of the person who
receives them."I5 To preclude the creation of multiple trusts which could use the
exclusion provisions to escape all taxation, the exclusions from income should
not be made generally available to trusts. Their use should be limited to individ-
uals.
Since this treatment would discriminate against transferees who have
legitimate human needs for receiving all gifts and bequests in trust (transferees
such as minors or others in need of professional management), individuals should
be given an elective provision to treat all trusts to which they are a beneficiary
as pure conduits. This would allow individuals to use their personal exclusions
at the trust level but not generally impose complex attribution or record keep-
ing costs. Most plans which create trusts for personal rather than avoidance
reasons use only 'one or two simple trusts to accomplish their goals. If multiple
trusts were involved, however, the individual or guardian could evaluate the
benefits of receiving the personal income exclusion against the increased costs
"
3 See Barnett, Tax Reform by Frankenstein, 25 TR. & EST. 10, 12 (1986).
"
4 See Barnett, id., at 22; Ritchie, Tax Reform: Rxfor a Headache, 25 TR. & EST. 22 (1986).
11In addition to the inequities of deferral cited previously (note 111, supra), failure to include these receipts
in the taxable income of the trust would result in the trust obtaining a zero basis in the property. This would
prohibit the trust from taking any depreciation charges against income earned while the property was retained
by the trust (See Dodge, supra note 14, at 1195). This result is inequitable. Individuals who received proper-
ty via trusts would eventually pay taxes on distributed trust income which had not been reduced for deprecia-
tion. This would result in a higher tax liability for individuals who earn income in trust as opposed to in-
dividuals who earn income via outright ownership.
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of conduit treatment. If multiple trusts are involved, competent financial advisors
are sure to be close at hand.
As to the taxation of the income from trusts, the current rules which generally
tax distributed income to the beneficiaries and undistributed income to the trust
should be continued 1 6 in spite of their inequities. This would alleviate many
potential transition problems by continuing to closely approximate postreform
results to prereform tax liabilities. However, to preclude the use of multiple trusts
solely to decrease tax liability, while not discouraging the legitimate use of trusts,
the rate of tax on income which is not distributed should be the maximum in-
dividual rate. 17
To alleviate any potential discrimination which the imposition of the max-
imum rate might engender, the pure conduit election could be extended to the tax-
ation of the income from trusts. Again, individuals could weigh the benefits of
the provision against its administrative costs.
While the pure conduit elections, like so many benefit provisions in the tax
code, are intended to prevent inequitable results, no attempt should be made to
limit their application. The election should be available to all since its results will
only match, not improve upon, the results which would have resulted had the
transfer not been made in trust. The pure conduit election, if adopted, should be
considered a "method of accounting." 118 This will preclude adoption on a
piecemeal basis solely to reduce taxes in any one given year.
7 Generation-skipping Transfers
One means of incorporating the goals of the generation-skipping tax into an
integration proposal is to simply ignore it. The present separate tax on the
transferor could remain in place, virtually unchanged, until its effects have been
more closely evaluated. 19 Or, in the alternative, the present tax could be allowed
to become, in fact, what it has in reality been all along - an excise tax on the
privilege of transferring property beyond the reach of wealth taxation in the next
generation.1 20 A retained generation-skipping tax, regardless of form, could be
required to be reported and paid to the IRS via the transferor's annual income tax
return, just like the self-employment tax. Of course these alternatives would result
16nSee generally I.R.C. of 1986, Subchapter J of Chapter 1, "Estates, Trusts, Beneficiaries, and Decedents,"
§ 641 through 691 (1986).
17 The most equitable rate would be 33 percent, or the current top rate, to prevent manipulation solely to avoid
the phasing out of personal exemptions which was provided for by TRA'86. See I.R.C. § 1 (1986).
111.R.C. § 446 (1986).
"
9 See authors' comments on the problems with the present tax at note 3, supra. For an alternative treatment
for generation-skipping transfers see Aaron & Galper, supra note 64, at 95, ". . . we suggest that a special
tax be imposed every thirty years on the assets of trusts created after 1976." Trusts whose only remaindermen
are the spouse or children of the creator would be exempted from the tax.
110 All of the current transfer taxes, the estate, gift and generation-skipping taxes are essentially excise taxes
on the privilege of transferring property. See Gutierrez, supra note 48, at 72.
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in maintaining, not eliminating, a limited version of the present dual system., 2
However, if outright repeal of the current generation-skipping tax is impractical
at this time, perhaps continuance of a limited dual system is not unreasonable.
If one wanted to continue to pursue the goals of the generation-skipping tax,
but also to eliminate the dual system, the tax could be integrated into the income
tax along with estate and gift taxes. One way in which integration could be ac-
complished would be to simply eliminate the individual income tax exclusion for
all gifts or bequests which were received from persons more than one generation
prior.
8. Charitable Contributions
The discussions surrounding the passage of TRA'86 made it clear that any
constriction of "tax favors" for charities could not be accomplished easily. Nor
do those discussions support the contention that the public desires to limit
charitable contributions, especially in this time of decreasing governmental sup-
port of eleemosynary activities. 22
To facilitate the acceptance of the integration proposal it is suggested that the
current rules be left intact, though perhaps, strengthening IRS review of institu-
tions' qualification for charitable status. The income tax rules should still apply
to inter vivos gifts to charities. The current split interest estate tax rules 123 which
govern testatmentary gifts to charities should also be retained. If a gift is made
by the estate directly to the charity, it will never be received by a taxable heir and,
therefore, will continue to pass free of tax. In addition, this proposal should pro-
vide a liberal disclaimer provision which would more readily foster transfers to
charitable organizations by heirs who wish to avoid the income tax consequences.
If, however, the heir wishes to donate property which was received via be-
quest, there should be a reasonable period, for example six months, during which
time the inter vivos gift limitations of Section 170(b)(1) are suspended. During
this period the amount of the contribution should be limited to the FMV received,
thus achieving a netting of the two transfers to obtain a zero tax liability on the
donated bequest. The taxpayer should also be given the option to elect out of this
netting provision in circumstances where the FMV had appreciated during the
"six month period." The taxpayer making this election, however, must be will-
121 The duality of the system would be limited since the generation-skipping tax applies to a very limited number
of individuals. Only those who can afford to transfer in excess of $1 million beyond the next generation are
subject to it. See also Shaffer, supra note 21, at 33-34... "While tax policy makers in Washington concoct
arcane regulations for the prevention of 'generation skipping' . . ., lawyers in the field report they rarely find
a client who is interested in skipping generations. Many lawyers say they would find the suggestion immoral;
their clients, apparently, agree."; Alexander, supra note IIl, at 676, "It might be assumed that there would
be a definite correlation between the size of the estate and the use of trusts skipping two or more generations,
but there is actually surprisingly little direct correlation of this character"; Verbit, supra note 40, at 674.
'
22See Salamon & Clotfelter, supra note 80, at 8, 14; Rudick, supra note 56, at 179.
1
23 1.R.C. §§ 2055(e)(1) and (2) (1986).
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ing to subject this appreciated gift to the normal inter vivos gift limitations of Sec-
tion 170(b)(1). Double benefits would not be appropriate.
The heir should also be given the option, in a very limited set of cir-
cumstances, of paying the federal income tax on bequests with a "payment in
kind." This would encourage the conservation of national treasures which other-
wise might have to be sold to meet tax liabilities. Similar proposals have worked
well in other countries and are worthy of consideration. 24
9. Insurance
Currently, insurance proceeds are subject to the estate and gift tax if they are
received by the estate, if the decedent had an incidence of ownership in the policy
at the time of death, or if the decedent had transferred an incidence of ownership
within three years of death for less than full and adequate consideration.' 25 Other-
wise, insurance proceeds are received tax free by the beneficiary.
To be equitable, under an integration proposal, these proceeds should be
treated no differently from other amounts which one receives as the result of the
death of another. There is no justification for preferential treatment which favors
insurance over any other form of investment. 26 However, this proposal, while
recognizing the inherent inequities and inefficiencies which it is advocating, favors
adopting the current estate and gift tax insurance provisions in the income tax. 27
Adoption of this provision is advocated because of the simple fact that any pro-
posal which suggested the immediate inclusion in taxable income of all insurance
proceeds would be doomed. 28
If proceeds which would not have been subject to the estate tax were suddenly
to become taxable, it would require the reappraisal and restructuring of almost
all existing estate plans. The disruption would simply be too severe. This in-
tegrated plan should be formulated to disrupt current estate plans as little as possi-
ble in order to minimize transition problems. If tax consequences do not
significantly change, existing estate plans should not need to be significantly
changed. Chances for adoption are greatly enhanced.
124 Recent comparative examples can be found in France and the U.S. The French government recently opened
the new Picasso Museum in Paris. The art collection is made up mostly of Picasso's estate holdings which
were transferred to the government in payment of death duties. Compare the estate of William Harrah, the
late casino owner from Reno, Nevada. His automobile collection, surely one of the most historically significant
of our time, had to be "gutted" in order to pay federal estate tax. Had the U.S. had a "payment in kind" pro-
cedure in place at the time of Harrah's death, his collection might well have been preserved for the public
at large. What we gained in short-term revenue has been more than offset by the long-term loss of a signifi-
cant historical collection which cannot be replaced. See also Verbit, supra note 40, at 680.
125 1.R.C. §§ 2035 and 2042 (1986).
126 See Dodge, supra note 14, at 1200; Rudick, supra note 56, at 179.
127It is interesting to note that the ABA Task Force on Transfer Tax Restructuring also struggled with the issue
of insurance and failed to reach a consensus, ABA Report, supra note 5, at Exhibit E.
128 To borrow a phrase from Brannon, supra note 48, at 279, "The indications are that our tax law in the future
should be designed after consultation with public relations experts."
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Furthermore, in any discussion of the taxability of insurance, political reality
must dictate. A proposal to tax insurance proceeds in the income of the beneficiary
is sure to arouse the ire of the vocal and powerful insurance lobby. Their concerted
effort to thwart this provision could jeopardize the entire integrated plan and pre-
clude passage of other provisions which, if adopted, could immediately simplify
and improve the taxation of individuals. Witness the end result of attempts to tax
insurance policy accumulations in TRA86 wherein the insurance lobby won out.
This paper strongly advocates a reappraisal of the preferential treatment
which is given to insurance proceeds but reluctantly acknowledges that the in-
tegrated plan should retain the current estate and gift tax rules in this area. The
proceeds should be included in the income of the beneficiary only if those pro-
ceeds would have been subject to tax in the decedent's estate: if they are received
by the estate, if the decedent had an incidence of ownership in the policy at the
time of death, or if the decedent had transferred an incidence of ownership within
three years of death for less than full and adequate consideration. Any reappraisal
of the taxation of insurance proceeds should be deferred until after the integrated
plan has been adopted or rejected on its policy merits.
10. Liquidity Problems
The current estate tax makes special provision for liquidity problems which
can arise in the situation where the property bequeathed is a family farm or a
closely held business.129 The special treatment of these properties is not unique
to the estate tax. However, it is neither equitable nor efficient. If the primary goals
of tax reform are the enhancement of equity and efficiency, a proposal to integrate
the estate and gift taxes into the income tax should not advocate the continuance
of this preferential treatment.
Benefits to alleviate liquidity problems should be made available to all tax-
payers depending upon their need, not the form of property they receive.' 30 In-
clusion in the income tax base of multiple heirs, who would be subject to lower
and less progressive rates than the decedent under the estate tax, would assist in
alleviating most liquidity problems."' In situations where greater relief is in-
dicated, such as where current tax liability would exceed some multiple of prior
average tax liability, installment payments could be made available.
11. State Taxes
One of the first major obstacles to the adoption of a federal estate tax was the
objections of the states, who had considered death taxation to be their private do-
129 1.R.C. §§ 303, 1040, 1223(11), 2032A, 6161(a)(2), 6163, 6166, 6324B, 66010) (1986).
1
3 0 See Dobris, supra note 8, at 377; Gutierrez, supra note 48, at 81. See also Graetz, supra note 17, at 285,
".... for some owners of small business and farms, their clout far outweighs their actual stake in the general
estate tax policies."
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main.' 3 2 From this earlier position of primary importance, the states have more
recently shown little interest in this area of taxation. Many have provisions only
to take advantage of the credit which is allowed to them under the present federal
tax. 33 However, one should not assume that they would silently overlook a reform
which denied preferential treatment for even these marginal sources of state
revenue.
While the integration into the income tax could easily continue the present
system of allowing a credit against federal taxes, the adoption of the proposal could
also offer an opportunity to the states to significantly streamline their own tax sys-
tems. Many states have income tax laws which mirror the federal tax. If inclu-
sion of gifts and bequests in the income tax base of the transferee is adopted at
the federal level, it would also be "picked up" at the state level. Since state in-
come taxes are already deductible under the federal income tax, no special pro-
vision would then have to be adopted. The benefits of eliminating the dual system
at the federal level might also be passed along to the states - a possible selling
point.
12. Funeral and Administrative Expenses
These expenses are currently deductible from the estate and, thereby, cur-
rently escape taxation.' 34 This equitable treatment should continue under the pro-
posed integration. If the expenses are paid by the estate prior to dispersal to the
heirs, the amounts will not be received by the heirs and, therefore, will never be
taxable to them. If, however, the payment of these expenses is made by the heirs,
Section 2053 should be adopted into the income tax to allow them to be netted
against the heirs' taxable receipts. This will assure that these necessary expenses
continue to be paid with before-tax dollars.
13. Tax Practitioners
A favorable response from tax practitioners is essential to the success of any
reform proposal. There have been numerous recent examples where economically
sound tax bills have failed to be passed primarily because of adverse response by
this respected community. 35 If an integration proposal is adopted, the transition
period will, of course, be difficult. The tax professional, however, must bear in
mind that the transfer tax laws will likely be changed. The profession will again
'32The major part of the revenue generated by the original estate tax was shifted to the states by the use of
credits (Revenue Act of 1942 § 301(b)) which, in effect, allowed the states to tax the first $40,000. For a historical
review of early federal death tax legislation, see generally Paul, Taxation In The United States (1954). See
also Surrey, supra note 17, at 5; DeWind, supra note 32, at 79; Groves, Retention of Estate and Gift Taxes
by the Federal Government, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 28 (1950).
133 I.R.C. § 2011(b) (1986). See also examples in Cal. Rev. & Tax §§ 11301 and 13302 (1983) and N.Y. Tax Law
§§ 951 through 963 (1983).
134 1.R.C. § 2053 (1986).
135See Barnett, supra note 113, at 10.
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be facing a period where the results of the simplest planning techniques cannot
be known with certainty. It would be far better to undergo this kind of disruption
for changes which can result in a simpler and more equitable structure than to
continue the present system of patchwork "reforms" which result in a system
which is ever more incomprehensible.
Integration has the advantage of using an existing tax with which the tax pro-
fessional is already intimately knowledgeable: the income tax. It also incorporates
most of the current transfer tax provisions which we have come to rely on as
gospel: the unlimited marital deduction, the unlimited charitable contribution,
the taxation of insurance proceeds, the taxation of transfers in trusts, the exclu-
sion of smaller estates and gifts, etc. These advantages are substantial. They would
smooth the transition period and allow at least some measure of confidence in
dealings with clients. The tax professional should not mistake novelty for com-
plexity, 136 but must consider the possibility that the integration of the estate and
gift taxes into the income tax could represent an opportunity for true reform.
VII. CONCLUSION
The growth and development of modern tax policy is not dissimilar to the
evolution of the biological species. Only through repeated efforts, and sometimes
sad failures, can we get closer to the ideal. This ideal in tax policy should fairly
balance the revenue needs of the taxing entity against the deleterious effects of
any tax. As with evolution, mature tax policy development can be painfully slow.
Historic opportunities for fundamental change come all too rarely. In the past,
many of the basic changes have come about due to the revenue needs generated
by armed conflagrations. Our country's present battleground is in the international
marketplace. We are fighting a new and bigger economic war now, a war which
we may never win as long as we are burdened with a nearly $3,000,000,000,000.00
deficit. Our economic stability and security is inexorably tied to deficit reduc-
tion. This reduction must, at least in part, be facilitated through revenue enhance-
ment. These new revenue impositions must reflect the lessons of history. They
must be "fair, understandable, and efficient."
The present dual individual federal tax structure has long proven itself to be
neither fair, understandable, nor efficient. The current season of fundamental tax
reform, started with TRA86, now provides our government with a unique win-
dow of opportunity. An opportunity to "pull the plug" on a patient who, for too
long, has been artificially kept alive by patchwork measures.
136See Halbach, supra note 22, at 69-70, "Novelty must not be confused with complexity. The possibility
of having a truly better and simpler tax structure in the long run should be given great weight in assessing
the potential for constructive change in this field, even if the price is a challenging period of transition"; McNul-
ty, supra note 8, at 100, "' . . even today (our present transfer taxes) have so much litigation and dissatisfac-
tion, that a shift to some new structure may not be as disadvantageous as it would at first seem... (Integra-
tion) merits. . . serious consideration instead of the endless tinkering and complexifying tax 'reform' efforts
that have so preoccupied us in recent years."
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By finally integrating wealth transfers into the "mainstream" of income tax-
ation, our government can create the best of both worlds: a tax which will not
only raise more revenue within the parameters of modern definitions of a "good"
tax, but also retain the better elements of the present wealth transfer tax system.
A well designed plan of integrated income taxation would also balance the
legitimate interests of protecting certain intrafamily transfers and charities while
yet revitalizing some of the original underlying policy justifications for the estate
tax. Because the income tax is subject to annual reporting and review, the con-
cerns for "unhealthy" accumulations of wealth can be more readily and efficiently
addressed than they are now.
The benefits to be derived from a truly integrated income tax are worthy of
further consideration and discussion. The wealth transfer tax structure would
cease to be the nagging poor relation of the income tax. TRA'86 began the pro-
cess of returning to both economically and procedurally sound tax policy. The
time is ripe for Congress to finish the job. The worthwhile goals of wealth transfer
taxation should now be accomplished through the income tax.
VIII. APPENDIX I
Linkage between the Income and Estate Taxes
The income and estate taxes have traversed a common path through the an-
nals of federal tax policy. Prior to 1913 the primary sources of federal revenues
were tariffs and excise taxes. Income and estate taxes were enacted as temporary
measures primarily to finance wartime expenditures. Though never enacted joint-
ly, the estate tax was always adopted shortly after the income tax and repealed at
about the same time that the income tax was being declared unconstitutional. The
sole purpose of each was to raise revenue. And each was abandoned when the
revenue need ceased. World War I, however, marked a dramatic change in this
policy. Neither the income tax nor the estate tax was repealed after that war.'37
Tax policy had changed. Congress, rather than concentrating on the tem-
porary needs of the impending war, sought a more consistent and permanent
means of raising revenues in the future. Ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment
in 1913 reflected this policy change. It enabled the enactment of a permanent in-
dividual income tax that same year. This was followed by the enactment of a p er-
manent estate tax in 1916.138
137 War Estate Tax Income Tax
Undeclared 1797-1802 -
Civil War 1862-1870 1861-1872
Spanish American War 1898-1902 1894-1895
World War I 1916- 1913-
Sources, J. Pratt, J. Bums, & W. Kulsrud, et.al., Individual Taxation 4-6 (1987 ed. 1986); Bentz, supra note 36.
""
8Revenue Act of 1918, P.L. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756 (1916). The modern gift tax was adopted by the Revenue
Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, §§ 501-532, 47 Stat. 245 (1932).
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While both are linked through their roles as permanent sources of revenue,
they are not equally effective in fulfilling those roles. The estate tax has never been
a major source of revenue. Except for a brief period during the 1930's, the estate
tax has never generated more than two percent of federal tax revenues - slight-
ly less than the revenues generated by the excise tax on cigarettes.' 3 9 In contrast,
the individual income tax has become the federal government's primary source
of funds accounting for almost fifty percent of all tax receipts. 40 The income tax's
emergence has been primarily due to its own enormous growth as measured in
terms of percent of GNP.'t4 In spite of renewed interest in excise and corporate
income taxes as sources of increased revenues, the individual income tax will con-
tinue to be the primary revenue raiser while the estate tax will continue to be an
insignificant nuisance.
World War I marked another significant change in federal tax policy. Con-
gress no longer viewed either the income or estate tax solely as a source of revenue.
Each was adopted to meet social as well as revenue goals. These social goals were
as inherently linked as the revenue needs which had triggered their use in the past.
They were both adopted to accomplish a limited measure of wealth redistribu-
tion. 42 The income tax was intended to prevent the undue accumulation of wealth
while the estate tax was intended to prevent the intrafamilial transfer of undue ac-
cumulations. 43
While both were again linked through their roles in wealth redistribution,
they were not equally effective in fulfilling those roles. The estate tax has never
been an effective a tool for preventing the transfer of undue accumulations of
wealth since only a very small portion of the potential base is redistributed. It was
estimated that private wealth in the United States totaled almost $9 trillion in
1982.44 It was also estimated that top wealth holders accounted for approximately
$2.4 trillion of that amount.145 Approximately three percent of private wealth in
'
39 Pedrick, supra note 37, at 114.
140 See Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 24, at 316-317.
141 GROWTH OF INDIVUDAL INCOME TAX re OTHER TAXES AS PERCENT OF GNP
Total Fed Excise Taxes Estate Taxes Income Tax
Taxes as % of % of % of % of % of % of
Year % of GNP Fed. Tax GNP Fed. Tax GNP Fed. Tax GNP
1902 2.3 47.6 1.095 1.0 0.023 0.0 0.000
1913 1.7 45.6 0.775 0.0 0.000 0.0 0.000
1922 4.6 24.4 1.122 4.1 0.189 5.6 1.178
1979 20.6 4.3 0.886 1.2 0.247 8.8 10.053
Source: Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 24, at 316-317.
142 Bentz, supra note 36, at 3.
14 3 It is interesting to note that one of the early supporters of the estate tax for "anti-wealth" purposes was
Andrew Carnegie, WEALTH, 149 N. AM. REV. 653, 659-660 (1889). It has even been asserted that it is the
lower economic classes, not the wealthy, which object most strongly to any attempts to increase the tax. See
Verbit, supra note 40, at 682.
144 1982 is the most recent year for which complete information is available. Schwartz, Preliminary Estimates




Gac and Brougham: Restructuring the Taxation of Wealth Transfers
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1988
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
the United States can be expected to pass through estates in any one year.146 This
would result in an estimated potential tax base of $72 billion for 1982 deaths. Total
tax revenues from estate tax returns filed in 1983 for 1982 deaths totaled approx-
imately $5 billion, 47 resulting in slightly less than seven percent of the potential
base being redistributed.1 48
Gross estates in excess of $300,000 reported in 1983 totaled only $50 billion
dollars, 49 approximately two-thirds of our $72 billion estimated base. While we
can not be sure whether this discrepancy is the result of an error in our estima-
tion, the use of the myriad avoidance techniques, or outright evasion it is,
nonetheless, troublesome. Comparison of tax liabilities to the smaller reported
tax base of $50 billion, however, results in wealth redistribution rising to ten per-
cent. This tax indeed accomplishes a "limited" wealth redistribution. Even ten
percent is hardly a significant dent in the accumulations of the wealthy.150
While the effectiveness of the income tax is less easily analyzed, its social
goals having been so dramatically expanded beyond the redistribution discussed
here, a consensus could no doubt be reached that it is significantly more effec-
tive than the estate and gift taxes. 51
In addition to being linked in their roles as permanent revenue sources and
redistribution tools, the income and estate taxes are inherently linked in their ob-
ject of taxation - the individual. While all taxes are ultimately borne by in-
dividuals, the income and estate and gift taxes have the most widely recognized
impact, by far. Few of us give much consideration to, or spend much time plan-
ning for, excises and tariffs or even the payroll tax. We may lament their reported
increases and notice their increased impact on our wallets, but we seldom take
any direct action. Such is not the case with either the income or estate and gift
taxes. A great deal of time and money is spent by individuals with the sole pur-
pose of reducing the impact of these two taxes. And the fact that they are two taxes
- the duality of the present system - has aggravated that impact.
IX. APPENDIX II
To illustrate how forward averaging of bequests could be implemented, the
following example is offered.
146 R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, supra note 24, at 490.
147 See Bentz, supra note 36, at 1-12.
1481f one includes the $2.5 billion of charitable contributions reported on all 1983 estate and gift tax returns,
id., the amount diverted from the wealthy increases to $7.5 billion dollars and the percentage diverted im-
proves to slightly more than 10 percent. However, it is unlikely that these charitable contributions are the result
of the estate tax and would most likely continue without its incentives.
t49 See Bentz, supra note 36, at 1-12.
15 0 See Boskin, supra note 15, at 63, "Since total national wealth is many trillion dollars, the paltry few billion
dollars raised annually by estate taxes cannot by its revenue raising alone accomplish very much in the way
of altering the wealth distribution." Isaacs, supra note 54, at 24, ". . . our estate and gift tax laws have whol-
ly failed in their purpose ... to reduce or even check extraordinary concentrations of wealth."
151 See Jatscher, supra note 17, at 51... "In the United States the federal income tax also erodes concentra-
tions of wealth ... ".
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RESTRUCTURING THE TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS
Assume that in addition to $150,000 of taxable income from other sources,
Individual A received an inheritance of $1 million from his father, a second in-
heritance of $600,000 from his aunt, and a gift of $21,000 from his mother dur-
ing 19XX. Further, assume that Congress had determined that each individual
was entitled to exclude $20,000 of gratuitous transfers from taxable income each
year, and that the appropriate period to apply to forward averaging was ten years. 5 2
Based on these assumptions, the tax liability for Individual A for 19XX could
be determined as follows:
1. Compute normal tax liability without bequests:
-Tax Income Tax Liability
Income from other sources $ 150,000 $ 42,000
Taxable gift in current year 21,000 5,880
Total (without bequests) $ 171,000 $ 47,880
2. Compute tax on "net forward gifts":
Net forward gifts $140,000b
at appropriate rate 28 %c
one years' increase $ 32,800
times ten years xl0
Tax on net forward gifts 328,000
3. Total tax liability for 19XX $ 375,880
A) Since Individual A has received an inheritance of more than $20,000 in
the current year, no portion of the exclusion is available for gifts. Thus
the entire $21,000 gift from his mother will be included in the current
year's income. This treatment is necessary to prevent a spate of death bed
gifts which could result in each heir receiving a $20,000 gift exclusion
and ten $20,000 "forward gift" exclusions in any one year. (See note b,
following).
B) The inheritances which totaled $1.6 million dollars would be averaged
over ten years resulting in a "forward gift" of $160,000 per year which
would qualify for the "forward year's" annual exclusion of $20,000 and
result in a "net forward gift" of $140,000.
C) If Individual A had not reached the maximum rate of twenty-eight per-
cent, or was in the period where the "surcharge" of an additional five per-
cent to phase out exemptions applied, the appropriate "mixed rate" should
be used.
"'The $20,000 personal exclusion was chosen since it is the amount which a couple could currently transfer
to each of their children or grandchildren without incurring the current gift tax. The ten year forward averaging
period was chosen since it would result in excluding $200,000 of bequests (ten $20,000 personal gift exclu-
sions) from each of the typical decedent's three (2.7) children and closely match the $600,000 exclusion which
is currently provided by the estate tax. These amounts are not intended to be used as guidelines; they were
merely chosen for illustrative purposes. The revenue implications of the interaction of the exclusion amounts
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